South Carolina Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 1 1966-1967 Survey Issue

Article 14

1967

Public Corporations
John C. von Lehe

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
von Lehe, John C. (1967) "Public Corporations," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 19 : Iss. 1 , Article 14.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss1/14

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

von Lehe: Public Corporations
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

I. CITE

FLuoRwATION ORDINANcE

HaZ v. Bates" was a case of novel impression in South Carolina. The supreme court upheld the city of Columbia's right to
fluoridate its water supply as a reasonable exercise of police
power. In the lower court the plaintiff, a resident of the city,
offered evidence to support his contention that fluoridation, far
from being beneficial to anyone, would be harmful to him and
to many others. The court found the overwhelming weight of
the evidence to show that fluoridation "is of tremendous benefit
in the prevention of caries and that such is not harmful to
2
anyone."
In considering the plaintiff's constitutional objections that he
had been deprived of liberty without due process of law, the
court stated that every decision in the United States was contrary to this contention." A lone dissent stated that "to be valid
as a legislative exercise of police power the legislation must be
clearly demanded." 4 The majority cited authority holding that
a municipality's police power is much broader when applied to
protect the health of its inhabitants.5
II.

CONSTITUTONAL DEBT LIITATIONS

In Boatwrigkt v. McElmurray the supreme court held that
the school district of Aiken County had been consolidated with
two other attendance areas to form the Monetta-Ridge Spring
Attendance Area. In so holding it determined the debt limitation issue.
Under the South Carolina Constitution a school district is
prohibited from incurring a bonded debt that exceeds eight percent of the assessed value of the taxable property within the
district7 In 1951 a constitutional amendment allowed the school
district of Aiken County a twenty-five percent limitation. In
1. 247 S.C. 511, 148 S.E2d 345 (1966).
2. Id. at 515, 148 S.E2d at 347.
3. The court quoted from Schuringa v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 504, 198

N.E.2d 326 (1964), and then listed a host of other decisions.
4. The dissenting justice quoted from McCoy v. Town of York, 193 S.C.
390, 8 S.E.2d 905 (1940), and Gasque, Inc. v. Nates, 191 S.C. 271, 2 S.E.2d
36 (1939).
5. Ward v. Town of Darlington, 183 S.C. 263, 190 S.E. 826 (1937).
6. 247 S.C. 199, 146 S.E.2d 716 (1966).
7. S.C. CoNsT. art. 10, § 5.
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1953 the legislature formed the Monetta area from the school
district of Aiken County and two districts having an eight per
cent debt limitation.
Since WaZker v. Bennet s it has been considered that upon consolidation of several school districts the constitutional debt
limitations of the former districts are destroyed because the
districts can no longer be considered separate entities. In holding the Aiken County district to be a part of the Monetta consolidation, the court, following Walker, imposed the eight percent limitation on the entire area.
In reaching its decision the court held an act nugatory which
attempted to construe the 1953 Monetta statute. The nugatory
act had assumed that the Aiken County district was not consolidated. The court stated that a school district once consolidated could be returned to its prior status only by legislative
enactment, not by legislative construction.
In Mungo v. ,Shecdd 9 the school district in question was in both
Lexington and Richland counties. By constitutional amendment Lexington was allowed a twenty percent and Richland a
fifteen percent debt limitation. The court allowed the district
a fifteen percent limitation and found the general eight percent limitation not applicable. The court felt that to apply the
eight percent limitation would frustrate the intention of those
who proposed and adopted the constitutional amendments.
llI.

BON-D ELTcio

In Moffett v. Traxeler"' the supreme court has extended the
established rule that the General Assembly may pass a law to
become effective on the happening of certain contingencies. The
court upheld the lower court decision that a portion of an existing act should take effect upon the passage of a constitutional
amendment.
The South Carolina Constitution provides that before authorizing a bond election for a municipality the General Assembly
must prescribe that a majority of its freeholders petition for
the election." The defendants held the bond election but ignored
8. 125 S.C. 389, 118 S.E. 779 (1923).

9. 247 S.C. 195, 146 S.E.2d 617 (1966).
10. 247 S.C. 298, 147 S.E.2d 255 (1966).
11. S.C. CONST. art. 2, § 13.
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the petition requirement. They relied on a 1965 constitutional
amendment stating that the General Assembly need not prescribe such a petition as a condition precedent to holding the
election. The plaintiffs argued that the amendment was not
self-executing and required subsequent legislation. Instead of
relying on the strong presumption in South Carolina that constitutional provisions are self-executing, 12 the court used the
1962 Municipal Bonds Act to execute the 1965 amendment.
IV. SUB-DasmioS

South Caroina State Highway Dep't v. Parker Water &
Sewer Sub-Dist.' was a case of first impression in South Carolina. The court invoked the common law rule that a political
sub-division must pay the cost of relocating its facilities when
highway improvement necessitates such relocation.1 4 The subdistrit-a body politic and corporate--in 1935 had constructed
water and sewer lines within the existing right-of-way of a
county road. In 1963 the road became a part of the state highway system. Subsequent improvements by the state necessitated
relocation of the right-of-way and, hence, of the lines. The
court said that though this was not a state highway at the time
the lines were installed, it was a public road existing for the
benefit of the public. The utility was charged with the knowledge that some day it might be required to relocate the facilities.
JOHN C. VON
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12. Brice v. McDow, 116 S.C. 324, 108 S.E. 84 (1921).
13. 247 S.C. 137, 146 S.E2d 160 (1966).
14. See generally 25 AM. JuR. Highways § 182 (1940).
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